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Abstract 
Halln/is, L., Partial inductive definitions, Theoretical Computer Science 87 (1991) 115-142. 
An attempt o consider partial definitions of semantically oriented data types will be described. 
We will in a certain sense think of such data types as inductively defined. A class of inductive 
definitions will be interpreted as partial definitions: partial inductive definitions. The presentation 
of such a definition is in itself elementary and the true complexity of the definition will show 
itself in questions concerning the isolation of totally defined objects. It is the same situation as 
in the case of partial recursive functions. 
The basic aim is to investigate the possibility to give direct inductive definitions of semantical 
notions exploring, so to speak, the structure of the given notion rather than to think of such 
notions as indirectly presented by a formal system or given by a definition, together with a proof 
of its correctness, in terms of recursion on some well-founded structure. 
Introduction 
Let us assume that f is a function defined by a set E of equations: 
f (0)  = a 
f (n  + 1) = g(h(n + 1),f(n))  
f (3)  is defined if we can compute f (3)  in E into a unique canonical value in a 
finite number of steps using usual rules of substitution. One could say that f (3)  in 
this case is totally defined, since given an equation f (5 )=g(h(5) , f (4 ) ) f (5 )  is at 
least partially defined in some sense even if we cannot compute a unique value in 
a finite number of steps. This distinction is basically motivated from an intensional 
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point of view. It is somehow a matter of expressing intentions in a definition. When 
we write down the equations E we intend to define a certain function and if we 
read E with this act of intent in mind f (n)  is undefined simply ought to mean that 
there is no equation f (n)  =. . .  in E. The situation is similar when we define the 
semantics for a formal language. Take the usual situation: We define True(A) by 
recursion on some well-founded relation. This corresponds to definingf by primitive 
recursion on some well-founded structure. Somehow this not only consists of an 
act of intent, but also a proof that this act totally fulfills the given intentions. That 
is of course something much more complex than just writing down your intentions. 
Here is a basic distinction between stating a definition and arguing that it really 
defines the intended notion and just as in the case with the function f there is a 
difference between being partially defined and not being defined at all. These 
distinctions result from focusing on definitions themselves rather than the abstract 
objects they should present. The basic motivation behind the work described here 
is the shift of viewpoint from definability to definitions that is initiated by computer 
science. Focusing on structural aspects of formal presentations i not new in 
logic--general proof theory for example--but computer science has given us strong 
reasons for this shift of viewpoint. We want to model general intensional properties 
of definitions. This means we have to consider questions like: What does a definition 
look like in general? What is the basic primitive interpretation of a definition? What 
does it in general mean for an object to be well-defined? What are the typical 
invariants that can help us to classify definitions in terms of intensional properties? 
What can the definitional reading of types learn us about computations? And so on. 
In this paper I will discuss some aspects of partial definitions based on an attempt 
to interpret a certain class of inductive definitions--including nonmonotone 
definitions--as partial definitions. The basic interpretation studied here is closely 
connected with work in general proof theory done by Martin-LSf, Prawitz and 
Schroeder-Heister, and generalizes Aczels characterization of monotone inductive 
definitions in [1]. I will focus on basic structural properties and have chosen to 
work with a simple infinite presentation of definitions. A finite presentation has 
been worked out jointly with Schroeder-Heister in [8]. Such a finite presentation 
may be used as a basis for a logical framework in the sense of Martin-L/Sf [15], 
Harper, Honsell and Plotkin [9] and Paulson [17]. Partial inductive definitions have 
been used as a foundation for a logic programming calculus in a joint work with 
Eriksson [6] where the syntax and semantics of specification languages are given 
by such definitions. 
1. Partial inductive definitions 
We assume there is given a universe U of objects which we will call atoms. Atoms 
will be denoted by a, b, c , . . .  (Such a universe will in many concrete cases be a 
universe of expressions. Perhaps to gain some basic intuition one may think of 
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atoms as names of objects yet to be defined or "built up". But one may also view 
these atoms in a more extensional manner simply as elements in a given set.) 
Definitions will now be considered as systems of definitional clauses (equations) 
that define atoms in terms of certain conditions. 
a- -A  
Now it is possible to present definitions in an abstract axiomatic fashion focusing 
on general structural aspects. But we are here mainly concerned with a specific class 
of conditions and will thus treat definitions on the basis of a more concrete 
presentation. 
1.1. Conditions (over U) 
• T is a condition (over U) (The empty condition), 
• _L is a condition (over U) (The universal condition), 
• Each atom (in U) is a condition (over U), 
• If C~ ( ic  I) is a condition (over U), then (G)~I  is a condition (over U), 
• If C and C' are conditions (over U), then C--> C' is a condition (over U). 
Conditions will be denoted by A, B, C , . . .  We let Cond(U) stand for the set of 
conditions over U. Finite sets of conditions will be denoted by F, ~ , . . .  
The notion of normal form for a condition is defined as follows: 
• T and _L are in normal form, 
• Each atom a is in normal form, 
• If C~ ( ic I )  is in normal form, then (G)~ is in normal form, 
• If C is in normal form, then C--> a, C--> _L and C--> Y are in normal form. 
We may translate a condition into a condition in normal form in the following 
manner: 
o(_L) = J_, o(T) = T, o(a)=a, 
o((C,),~,) = (o(C , ) ) ,~ , ,  
o(C-~ ±)=o(C) - ,  ±, o(C ~ T)=o(C) -~ T, 
o(C oa)=o(C)oa ,  
o(C -~ (c,),~,) = (o(C ~ G)),~, ,  
o (C  --, (c,-- ,  c2) )  = o((C, c , ) -~  c2) .  
of a condition in normal form can be measured as follows: The complexity 
k(±) = 
k(a) = 
k(T) = 0 
k((C,),~, = sup(k(C~)),~l 
k(C->C')=k(C)+l 
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The level of  a condition C will then be defined as 
l (C )=k(o(C) )  
1.2. Definitional clauses (over U) 
I f  a is an atom (in U) and A is a condition (over U), then a = A is a definitional 
clause (over U). 
1.3. Definitions (partial inductive definitions over U) 
• A definition (over U) is a set of  definitional clauses (over U). Definitions will 
be denoted by D, D', Dn, . . . .  
• The level l(D) of a definition is sup{l(A) l(a = A) ~ D}. 
• Let Dom(D)={a l (a :A)sD}.  
Adding a definition D '  to a definition D will be written as D+ D'. So in the 
present context where a definition is considered as a set D + D'  is just D w D'. 
m is the empty condition, i.e. a condition that is trivially fulfilled, 
for all C in { } it is true that . . .  
It is a matter of  presentation to use m instead of { } and not a matter of  difference 
in meaning. Of  course one may think of m as truth. In writing a = T we are saying 
that a is true by definition. 
± is the universal condition, i.e. a condition that it is impossible to fulfill, 
for all C it is true that . . . .  
One may think of  ± as falsity. The meaning of a = ± is intended to be the same as 
not defining a at all. I f  a is not defined at all, then a is false by definition since 
assuming a to hold is immediately absurd due to the fact that it is not even defined 
what it should mean for a to hold. 
Let /9 = D w {a = ±[a  ~ Dom(D)}. This is just to complete D with a = ± for all 
a where a intentionally is not defined at all. It is a matter of  presentation to use 
{±} instead of { } when referring to the definiens of  a. Definiens of  an atom a 
(relative to a given definition D) is given by 
D(a)  = {a[(a = A) ~ £)} 
So the symbol D will represent both a set of  clauses and a function. There is really 
no great risk of  confusion and technically one could of  course think of  the definition 
as a function from U taking sets of  conditions as values. 
Given a definition D the interpretation of  D we have in mind will not only tell 
us what property over U D defines, but also give us a local logic that reflects how 
D defines the property in question. 
--> will be given an interpretation i terms of the local notion of  logical consequence 
generated by D. = will be interpreted as definitional equality in the sense of  D, 
i.e. D gives us the basis for laws of substitution of  definiens for definiendum. 
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This interpretation will so to speak give the basic logical cover of D. It is the door 
we need to our world. Once this basic interpretation is given we may view it as a 
definition among others and consider different ypes of covers in relation to a given 
definition. 
1.4. Local D-consequence 
The interpretation of a given definition D will be given in terms of a derived 
notion of D-consequence Wo. This notion is presented by an elementary definition-- 
more precisely a monotone inductive definition. 
Let ~- be a relation between finite sets of conditions and conditions. Expressions 
of the form F ~ C will as ususal be called sequents. Let Seq(U) denote the set of 
sequents over U. We will write F, C as short for Fu  {C}. F will be called a condition 
relation if it has the following closure properties: 
(T) FFT, 
(±) F, ± ~ c, 
r~c i  ( icI)  (~()) 
F~(G),~, 
r , c ,~c  
(()F) (i c I),  
r, ( c,),~, F C 
F, C~ C' (~-~) 
FFC~C"  
(~)  FFC F,C'FC" 
F, C~C'~- C" 
A condition relation ~- is D-closed if in addition it satisfies 
F~-A 
O-D) (Ac D(a)), 
F~-a 
(D~-) 
F, AFC (AeD(a)) 
F ,a~C 
F is reflexive (I) if F, a ~- a holds for all a and F. 
Let ~o  be the smallest D-closed reflexive condition relation. The property then 
defined by D is 
Def(D) = {a I ~-o a}. 
So intuitively D defines the set of atoms logically true in the local logic generated 
by D. 
If we think of F in F ~- C as a set of assumptions one should note that adding 
an atom a to F is something which is quite different in meaning from adding a 
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clause a =-I- to the given definition. In the first case we assume F, a in the worm 
defined by D and in the second case we enlarge this world by saying that a holds 
by definition. Just consider the following simple example: 
Let D be {a = b}, then a t- o b, but ~-o, b is not true where D '  is 
{::} 
The notion of  a condition relation is meant as an explanation of  the condition 
constructions --> and ( )i~,. So if ~- is a condition relation this means that ~- behaves 
as a notion of  logical consequence with respect to -> and () i~,. The closure 
conditions for the arrow and family constructions are the same as Gentzens rules 
for implication and conjunction in his sequent calculus, and should here be thought 
of  as the basic logical interpretation together with reflexivity of  ~-. 
~- -> 0 - ( ) )  explains what it means to establish a condition in arrow form (family 
form) as a conclusion and -> ~-(()~-) explains what it means to assume a condition 
in arrow form (family form). 
~-D and D~- are meant to explain in what sense definitional clauses defining an 
atom a in a definition gives the basis for a law of substitution: I f  you want to 
establish a as a conclusion with respect o the meaning of a given by D you may 
do so by establishing any A in the definiens of  a as a conclusion. I f  you want to 
establish that C follows from a you may do so by establishing that C follows from 
all A in the definiens of  a. 
I (reflexivity) gives the basic axiom of logical consequence. 
In general one may think of  the right hand side conditions as closure conditions 
and the left hand side conditions as reflection conditions. In particular, ~-D tells us 
how Def (D)  is built up, and D~- reflects these constructions. 
Proposition 1.4.1. (i) IrE, 1- ~-o C, then F ~ o C. 
(ii) I f F  ~o  _l_, then F ~-o C. 
Proof. By a simple induction on ~-o. [] 
So assuming truth gives no information and proving falsity is absurd. 
Proposition 1.4.2. I"- D ~--- ~ ' - "D~{a=±}.  
Proof. By induction on t- o and ~O~{o=±}. [] 
± is the universal condition, so adding a = ± should mean nothing. 
Let us say that a condition C is true in D if -1- F- o C and false in D if C ~--D ±. 
Proposition 1.4.3. (i) C is true in D iff F- o C. 
(ii) C is false in D iff C ~-oC' for all C'. 
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Proof. Trivial. [] 
T is true in D and not false in D. ± is false in D and not true in D. Thus T and 
± may be considered as basic truth values where the assignment of truth values is 
related to ~o. 
1.5. The cover of a definition 
Def(D)  only contains the atoms true in D, but in order to calculate Def(D)  we 
need to know more about general conditions being true in D. So in a certain sense 
the set of conditions being true in D covers Def(D).  Let 
Coy(D) = {C IF-D C} 
Proposition 1.5.1. a ~ Def ( D ) iff D( a ) m Coy(D) is nonempty. 
Proof. If C c Coy(D) for some C ~ D( a ), then a ~ Def ( D ) since t-o is D-closed. 
If on the other hand a 6 D, then clearly there must be some C ~ D(a) such that 
C c Coy(D). This follows from the fact that t--D is the smallest D-closed reflexive 
condition relation. [] 
The dual notions to Def(D)  and Coy(D) are 
Def (D)= {ala ~--D ±} 
Coy(D) = {C[C ~-D ±} 
1.6. Notes 
Our formal treatment of definitions here is a generalization of Aczels characteri- 
zation of monotone inductive definitions in terms of rule sets in [1]. A rule set 
corresponds to a definition of level <~1. The interpretation of such definitions is 
then given by the closure rule t--D. Thus in order to characterize Def(D)  for such 
definitions we never have to give an interpretation of what it means to assume an 
atom according to a given definition. 
One may also consider the present framework as a certain generalization of the 
notion of a Post system. 
Note that the basic interpretation of ~-o is given by a monotone inductive 
definition. 
Much inspiration for what is discussed here comes from work on higher level 
rules in general proof theory done by Schroeder-Heister [22, 23, 24], Martin-L6f 
[12, 13, 14] and Prawitz [18, 19, 20, 21]. An important source for the proof theoretic 
work on higher level rules is the work of Lorenzen [11]. 
When considering truth values there is for a given definition D often a gap 
between T and ±. There may be some connections between the interpretation of a 
definition and the operators Kripke works with in his theory of truth [10]. 
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One could also think about connections with illative combinatory logic [3] and 
the notion of a Frege structure [2]. Definitional clauses would then be viewed as 
fixpoint equations. 
2. Total and partial objects 
If a c Dom(D)  for a given definition D, this means a is defined in D- - to  be more 
precise one should say D(a)  # {±}, since if D(a)  = {_1_} this really means that a is 
not even defined in D. But having a definition does not imply that this definition is 
meaningful. So besides the notion of being defined in D we need to consider some 
notion of a meaningful definition. We would like to characterize what it could mean 
for a to have a determined meaning in D, i.e. that a is well-defined in D. Classically 
this corresponds to saying that a is given a unique truth value in D. What one at 
least would like to see following from a notion of a being well-defined in D is that 
a has at most one truth value in D- -what  corresponds to the law of contradiction. 
We will interpret his notion in terms of transitivity of ~-o (what in proof theory 
following Gentzen is called cut elimination). Unlike ~-o this notion of being well- 
defined is not an elementary notion, and it is exactly at this point that the true 
complexity of a definition becomes visible. 
The connection between transitivity of r-o and truth values we think of here is 
the following one: 
-I- ~-o a: a is true 
a F--D ±: a is false. 
We may think of -I- as a left truth value of a and _1_ as a right truth value of a. These 
two truth values are distinct, which is shown by the fact that -I- is not a left truth 
value of _1_ and ± is not a right truth value of -I-. So generalizing this situation we 
have an intuitive motivation for choosing transitivity of ~-o as a candidate for the 
basis of a notion of being well-defined in D: 
aF-ob  
means that b has a left truth value a and 
b~DC 
means that b has a right truth value c. Then a ~'--D C follows since b is well-defined 
and thus has at most one truth value, i.e. a and c must not be distinct as truth values. 
The situation can be illustrated by a canonical and simple example. 
R{a=a~b} 
a is defined to hold in D if b follows from a in D. This is somehow the canonical 
example of a definition introducing non-well-defined objects--partial objects. R 
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gives the structure of paradoxes like Russell's paradox and the liar. We verify ~D a 
and a ~-D b as follows: 
a~-a bF-b 
a ,a~b~-b  
aF-b 
~-a~b 
~-a 
Since b clearly is false in R this means that a is both true and false in R: 
a~-a b~-Z 
a ,a~b~-  k
a~-Z 
Now enlarge R" 
R b= 
Clearly ~--R' a, a ~-R' b and not ~--R' b. But b is not false in R'. The difference is that 
b here is defined although the definition is empty in content, b is a well-defined- 
total--object in both definitions. 
2.1. Local transitivity 
Let us say that D is transitive at C if 
F ~-D C and X, C ~-D C' 
implies F, !; f--D C' for all F, X and C'. 
This local transitivity is not always hereditary over D(a). Just consider 
t } D a=b b=b-~c 
D is transitive at a, but not at b. 
2.2. S(D, C) 
Given a condition C, then S(D, C) is intuitively going to be the definitional 
constitutents of C with respect o D: 
• CoS(D,  C), 
• I facS(D,  C) and C'cD(a) ,  then C'cS(D,  C), 
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• I f (C i ) ,~zeS(D,C)  then CieS(D,C)  for all i~ / ,  
• If  ClO C2e S(D, C), then Ci e S(D, C) (i = 1, 2). 
2.3. Total objects 
A condition C is said to be a total object in D if D is transitive at C'  for all 
C'e S(D, C). A definition D is said to be a total definition if all conditions are total 
objects in D. 
Note that if C is total in D, then all C'eS(D,  C) are total in D, and that C is 
total in D iff D is transitive at all atoms a e S(D, C) (this is essentially to prove 
cut elimination in infinitary propositional logic). T and _L are total objects in D for 
every D. 
Propositions 2.3.1. I f  D is a total definition, then F-o is a consequence r lation (in the 
sense of Tarski), i.e. F-o is reflexive, monotone and transitive, 
Proof. ~-o is clearly monotone. Reflexivity and transitivity follow directly by 
definition. [] 
So totality ensures that D generates a reasonable local notion of logical con- 
sequence, i.e. a reasonable interpretation of the intuitive notion of C' follows from 
C in D. It is easy to see that definitions of level <~1 are all total. So ordinary 
monotone inductive definitions are the canonical examples of total inductive 
definitions. 
2.4. Completeness 
We will say that a condition C is complete in D if 
C e Coy(D) u Coy(D) 
and that D is complete if 
Cond( U) = Coy(D) w Coy(D) 
Proposition 2.4.1. (i) I f  D is both total and complete, then each C has a unique truth 
value, 
(ii) D is both total and complete iff ~o is standard implication, i.e. A F-Ü B is 
equivalent to if ~-D A, then F-o B. 
Proof. (i) I f  D is complete, then by definition each C has a truth value, and if in 
addition D is total, no C can be both true and false. 
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(ii) Assume that D is a total and complete definition. Assume A f-D B and that 
~-D A, then by totality ~"D B. Now assume ~-o A implies ~-D B. If A ~-D B doesn't 
hold, then ~--A (by completeness) and not f-D B, which is absurd, so we have A ~--D B. 
Assume ~-D is implication. Clearly D has to be total. If ~-D C, then C is true, and 
if ~D C doesn't hold then C has to be false, since ~--D is standard implication. [] 
2.5. The relation <D 
Consider the following relation <o on Cond(U) generated by D: 
Ci <D (Ci)ict 
C, C '<oC~C'  
A <l~a(Ac D(a)) 
Let us call D well-founded if <D is a well-founded relation on Cond(U). 
Take 
D{; - -aT} ,  D'~a=a~ 
[b=aJ "  
Both D and D'  are total definitions. D is a well-founded efinition, while D' is not. 
Proposition 2.5.1. I f  D is well-founded, then D is both total and complete. 
Proof. That D is complete can be seen directly by induction on <o-  Just consider 
the case of an atom a: By IH AcCov(D)wCov(D)  for all AcD(a) .  So if 
Coy(D) c~ D(a) is nonempty, then a is true and if Coy(D)c~ D(a) is empty, then 
a is false. 
To prove that D is total is to prove cut elimination for ~-i) on basis of the 
well-founded relation <D. [] 
2.6. Notes 
One may compare the notion of a total definition D to the standard notion of a 
total recursive function F. In both cases totality refers to objects being well-defined. 
• F(n) is well-defined, i.e. there is a unique value, 
• ~-o C is well-defined, i.e. the meaning is uniquely determined. 
Or compare 
• F(n) is well-defined, i.e. there is a unique value, 
• C is a total and complete object in D, i.e. C has a unique truth value. 
By saying that D is a total definition we put a lot of faith in D just as we put a 
lot of faith in F by saying that F is a total function. The recursion theoretic approach 
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to totality is perhaps more extensional in nature: One doesn't make a distinction 
between being defined and being well-defined, i.e. a distinction between 
a is total in D, ae Dora(D), and D(a) ={1}. 
This is of course a consequence of the fact that recursion theory focuses on definability 
whereas we here try to focus on definitions. 
The ususal way to ensure totality for a definition involving the arrow construction 
is to base the definition on some well-founded relation. Typical examples are the 
definition of a predicate by recursion and the notion of iterated inductive definitions 
(see [12]). 
The definition R is of course closely connected with Curry's paradox in illative 
combinatory logic (see [3]). The notion of a proposition in illative combinatory 
logic and Frege structures could perhaps be related to total objects. 
3. Induction 
The basic idea of induction is the following one: We assume there is a given 
property E that we think of as built up in a certain manner. If E '  is another property 
which is closed under the principles used to build up E, then every object that 
satisfies E will also satisfy E'. Usually we have an extensional view of properties 
as sets of objects. In the present context it is natural to start from a more intensional 
point of view and think of properties as definitions. The basic idea is then to consider 
some object O(D)-- l ike Def(D), Cov(D)--associated with D and try to show that 
~-D, satisfies some conditions in order to be able to conclude that O(D)c  O(D'), 
etc . . .  
3.1. Elementary induction 
Let D'  be a definition such that ~-o, is D-closed. Then F ~-o C implies F ~o, C. 
This principle of induction on ~-o may be called elementary induction on ~o since 
it is just an instance of the standard principle of induction over a monotone inductive 
definition. 
Let X c U. We say that a condition relation ~- is XD-closed if it is closed under 
~- D and 
F ,A~C (AeD(a) )  
aeX.  
F ,a~-C 
Let ~xo be the smallest reflexive XD-closed condition relation. Let 
Def(XO) = {alF-xo a}. 
Now assume that Def(D) = Def(XD),  then we have a principle of induction on 
Def(D): If ~-o, is XD-closed, then Def(D) c Def(D'). We may call this induction 
on XD. 
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Typically induction on Def(D) ,  where l(D) <~ 1, can be seen as induction on OD. 
As a simple example consider the following definitions over U = {a, b, c}: 
D1 b=T 
By OD~ induction we see that Def (D~)c  Def(D2), but while c ~ J_ c Cov(D~) this 
is not the case for Coy(D2). 
3.2. Induction and total objects 
3.2.1. Induction and total definitions 
Assume D '  is a total definition and that we show for all a ~ U 
A c D( a ) implies A H D. a, and 
there is a Ac  D(a)  such that a f-D, A, 
then ~-D' is D-closed. 
Assume we have the following situation: Dom(D2)c  Def (D) l ,  where both D~ 
and D2 are definitions of  level <~l. If we have shown A ~-o2 a for Ac  D~(a), then 
for all a there is a Ac  Dl(a) such that a ~-D2 A. If a ~ Def(D~), then a ~ Dora(D2) 
and thus D2(a) = {3_}. I f  on the other hand a ~ Def(D1), then a c Def(D2). This 
follows from the fact that both definitions are of  level ~<1. So ~-D2 A for some 
A c D~(a). Now this situation is the ususal one in case of  induction on monotone 
inductive definitions. But these things don't  hold in general even for definitions of  
level ~< 1, which already appears from the example above illustrating XD-induction. 
Note that if D is both total and complete, then A ~-Da is the same as: if f-DA, 
then f-D a. Typically any E c U is trivially captured by a total and complete definition 
E{e=T}ecE.  
In this case ~-E e really just means e c E. 
3.2.2. Induction on total objects 
Let us think of  a property D '  as a D-property if at least it gives a meaningful 
definition to everything being well-defined in D. So we call D '  a D-property if all 
D-total C are D'-total. The intuition is that these D-properties gives the true 
properties over Def(D) .  
Proposition 3.2.1. I f  D' is a D-property and for all D-total a c U 
Ac  D(a) implies A~-o,a, and 
there is a A c D( a ) such that a f-ty A, 
then C c Cov(D') for all D-total C c Coy(D). 
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Proof. By induction on ~--D we verify that if FF-DC , where all C'eFw{C} are 
D-total, then F t--D, C. We just consider (~- D) and (D ~-): 
F~-DA 
F~-ua 
If a is total in /9, then so is A. Thus by IH F ~u' A. By assumption we have A ~D'  a. 
A is total in D and since D' is a D-property this means A is also total in D', so F F D, a. 
F,A~-DC (AeD(a)) 
F, aF-DC 
Since a is total in D each Ae D(a) is also total in D. So by IH F, A t--D, C for all 
A e D(a). By assumption we have a ~--D' A for some A e D(a). Reasoning as above 
we conclude F, a t--D, (7. [] 
4. Some examples 
4.1. Monotone inductive definitions 
Any ordinary (i.e. monotone) inductive definition is clearly a definition in the 
present sense. 
Assume U is a universe that contains 0 and is closed under s, then the ordinary 
inductive definition of the natural numbers may be written as 
Assume Var is a set of propositional variables and that U contains Var and is 
closed under all the standard syntactical operations of propositional logic, then the 
syntax of propositional logic may be defined by 
t ~AI~/----((~, II/) ( ~,~=c~ ~,~'~,r~,,~U 
Clearly Def(OD) = Def(D) for such a definition. Thus the ordinary principle of 
induction on such a definition is simply 0D-induction on D. 
4.2. Functional closure 
Given a universe U, where a--  a l , . . . ,  an e U and f=f l , . . . , fm e[U-~ U], let 
(8, f )  denote the following definition: 
ai----T ( i<~n)  
(a )=a (j<~m)J.~u" 
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Given a functional F : [  U -  U]-~ U let F denote the definition 
{F(g) = (a -~ g(a))oc u}g~[u~ ul. 
Some simple properties: 
(i) ai c Def (F+(d, f ) ) ;  Def (F+(a , f ) )  is closed under allfj. I fDef (F+ (a, f ) )  
is closed under some gc[U~ U], then F(g ' )cDef (F+(a , f ) )  for some g 'e  
[ U ~ U] such that g] Def(F + (a, f ) )  = g'] Def(F + (a, f ) ) .  Just define g' as follows: 
~g(a) if aeDef (F+(a , f ) ) ,  
g'(a) = [F(id) otherwise. 
In this way we have a trivial guarantee that (a ~ g'(a)) ~ Cov(F + (d, f ) )  for all a c U. 
(ii) Note that Def(F+O)~ O, since Def (F+(a , f ) )  will always contain F(id). 
(iii) F(g) ~- F+(~,r) g(F(g)) holds for every (a, f )  where D(F(g)) = (a -* g(a))a~ u. 
The argument for this is the same as in the canonical example of a partial definition 
given in section 2. So in this case F(g)cDef (F+(a , f ) )  is a partial object in 
F+(a , f )  if g(F(g))¢_ Def (F+(gl, f )) .  
4.3. Generalized propositional logic 
Let us consider a family of definitions over Def(Prop) that gives a presentation 
of what we may call generalized propositional logic. The basis of this family is the 
following definition: 
',/, A 0 = (4,, O) ~ 
4, vO=O 
r ,  evO=O 
4,~0=4, - ,  0 
T gives the basic semantics of Def(Prop). By an interpretation we will understand 
a definition over Var (the given set of propositional variables). We will write D N ~b 
for ~--r+D ~b where D is an interpretation. T is a total definition--actually also a 
complete one--and T+ D will be total and complete whenever D is. We have the 
following general properties of D ~ &: 
D~p iff p~Def (D)  
D~b^~ 
DI= &v~, 
D~DO 
iff D N ¢ and D ~ qJ 
iff D~b or D~ ¢ 
iff (tb~ q,)~ Cov(T+D) 
iff ( tb-~2)c Cov(T+D). 
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Whenever D is a total and complete interpretation the following will hold: 
D~ 05~0 iff i fD~ 05, then D~ qJ 
D~05 iff not D~ 05 
Ordinary classical interpretations will then correspond to interpretations D such 
that D(p)  = {T} or {_t_}. If  we consider in addition the possibility of having D(p)  = 
{p}, then we will get a certain three-valued interpretation where a clause p = p gives 
the truth value unknown to p. So we may distinguish between 
true if Y ~T+D 05, 
TD(05 ) = ~false if 05 }--T+D _1_, 
[ unknown otherwise. 
Of course we do not get a traditional three-valued logic since implication is no 
longer truth-functional. Just consider the two cases p D q and p D p and assume that 
both p and q are interpreted in terms of the truth value unknown. Then p = q will 
have the truth value unknown, while p D p of course is true. This situation may be 
explicated as follows: The general interpretation of implication is not given in terms 
of truth functions. It is only when we have complete information that we can think 
of implication as a truth function and unknown indicates absence of information. 
The interpretation that gives the truth value unknown to all propositional variables 
will give us logical truth in intuitionistic propositional logic. 
In general this propositional logic explicates ome logical properties of definitions 
over Vat. It is easy to see how to consider predicate logic in this manner also. 
Definitions will then define predicates over a given Herbrand universe. 
The syntax and semantics of second-order propositional logic may be given as 
follows: 
p=T } 
Prop_05 D ~b = (05, tp ) 
[vx05(x) = (0 -~ 05(0))oE u 
[VX05(X) = (05(O))o~D4(prop)J" 
Given this basic semantics we may consider interpretations D over Var and a notion 
of truth in a given interpretation i terms of ~--T+D- 
4.4. Naive set theory 
When we think of the semantics of a formal system as given by a partial inductive 
definition we think of the semantics itself as something elementary given. The true 
complexity of the semantics enters into the picture when we try to isolate the total 
objects of the definition. A canonical example that illustrates this situation is of 
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course the syntax and semantics of naive set theory, 
Prop( c~ A O) = ( Prop( qb )' Prop(O)) 
Prop( c~ D O) = ( Prop( q~ ), Prop(O)) 
Prop(Tq~ ) = Prop( qb ) 
PS Prop(Vx&(x)) = (Set (a )~ Prop(~b(a)))a~u . 
Prop( a -~ b) = (Set(a),  Set(b)) 
Prop(a c b) = (Set(a),  Set(b)) 
Set({x[~b (x)}) = (Set(a) ~ Prop(c~(a)))a~ u 
where U is a large enough universe of expressions. 
So given this definition of Prop and Set we define the notion of truth over 
"6 A ~=(6 ,  ¢,) 
T , -70  = &-~ L 
Vx&(x)=(&(a))~,sse, l , )  
a-~ b=(ce  a~ c~ b, ce b~ c~ a)~,,~s~,~,) 
~a c {x I ~b(x)} = ~b(a) 
The ususal distinction between sets and classes will here be embedded in the 
distinction between total and partial objects. What we get here is a view of set theory 
as a language which is very different from set theory as an axiomatic description 
of the cumulative universe of sets. When actually using such a languge as a basic 
formal language, the process of reasoning will enter points where we of course have 
to reflect on the given definition: Is the object C really totally defined or not? This 
is often enough not an easy question, but calls for careful considerations. It is really 
the same situation when we want to add a new type to say Martin-L6fs theory of 
types: Does the formation, introduction, computation and elimination rules we have 
in mind make sense? What is different is that in the case of a language of set theory, 
like the one given above, we think of the very definition as elementary, admit partial 
objects and the basic framework is formally already given. It is always possible to 
work the hard way and see what reasoning the definition in itself allows for. We 
do of course not place any belief into the definition, only intentions, so there is no 
question about consistency or the like. Inconsistencies remains a question of mis- 
placed belief. 
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4.5. Function definitions 
At least from a syntactical point of view it looks as if ordinary equational definitions 
of functions represent typical examples of definitions considered here. Let us look 
at the definition of plus, 
fx+O=x / + B 
lx  + s(y) = s(x + y)/x,y DeS N " 
Now a natural question is if ~-+ gives an interpretation of what it means to compute 
n from e in +: e ~-+ n. There are two basic problems with this. First of all, if we 
try to compute s(s(O)) from O+ s(s(O)), we will after one step using (+~-) end up 
with s(O+s(O)) and the definition doesn't say anything about such an expression. 
What is lacking is obviously a notion of substitution. So we can add a new clause 
for each noncanonical s(x), i.e. for s(x)~ Def (N)  
s(x) = ((x ~ y) ~ s(Y))y~OeS~N) 
which intuitively means that we, by definition, may replace s(x) by s(y) if we have 
computed y from x. The problem with this is that the basic logical interpretation 
we give of F--D is really not the intended one when we speak of n is computed from 
e. It simply doesn't make sense and it is easy to see that O+s(O)~-+ s(s(O)) holds 
due to the logical interpretation of assumptions. We have s(O + 0), 0 + 0 ~- s(O): 
0~-0 
0+0~-0  
0+0 ~- 0+0--, 0 0+0,  s(O) ~- s(O) 
(o + o-> o)--, s(O), o+o ~ s(O) 
s(O+O), o+o F- s(O) 
o+ s(O), o+o ~ s(O) 
Using this we prove O+ s(O)~-s(s(O)) as follows: 
O+s(O) ~ o+o-~ s(O) s(s(O))~s(s(O)) 
o+ s(O), (o+ o-> s(O))--, s(s(O)) ~ s(s(O)) 
o+ s(O), s(O+O) ~ s(s(O)) 
o+ s(O) ~- s(s(O)) 
(to skip some trivial steps we have used the fact that if D(a) = (C~)i~i, then a ~- C 
follows from Ci ~- C.) 
What is happening is that we destroy the intended reading by using the purely 
logical operation of contraction in the process of computing O+ s(O) which of course 
doesn't make sense. So what we need is another interpretation of ~--D that gives us 
the intended one in case of function definitions. How this may be done without 
leaving the basic framework will be discussed in the section on intensional operators. 
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5. Operators 
The notion of an inductive definition is often presented in terms of operators 
~:P(U)~P(U) .  
A monotone inductive definition is then simply such an operator which is monotone 
with respect to set inclusion. Below we will describe some simple connections 
between partial inductive definitions in general and operators. 
5.1. Extensional operators 
5.1.2. X~C 
Let X be a subset of U. We will define X ~ C for conditions C. 
X~7,  X~±,  
X~a iff a~X,  
X~(C, )~t  iff X~ Cg ( i c I ) ,  
X~ C-->C' iff X~ C implies X~C' .  
5.1.3. ~D 
The natural extensional operator @D associated with a definition D is then given 
by 
~D(X) ={a[X  ~ A for some Ac  D(a)} 
Proposition 5.1.1. (i) I f  I( D) <~ 1, then Def ( D) is the smallest fixpoint of C~)D, 
(ii) I f  ~D has a fixpoint X, then Def (D)c  X, 
(iii) I f  D is total and complete, then Def(D) is the unique fixpoint of ~D. 
Proof. (i) I f  I(D)<~ 1, then ~D is the ordinary monotone operator associated 
with D. 
(ii) Let Dx be the definition {x=Y}x~x. Since X is a fixpoint of ~D it follows 
by induction on D that Def(D) c X. Dx is a total and complete definition, so we 
have to show given ac  U that (a) for all A~D(a)  A~-Dxa, and (b) there is an 
A c D(a) such that a }--D, A. 
If  D is both total and complete, note that Def(D) ~ C is equivalent o [--D C. 
We use induction on C to see this: The cases when C is an atom or a family of 
conditions are trivial, so assume Def(D) ~ CI ~ Ce and that [--D Cl, then by IH 
Def(D) ~ C~, so Def (C)~ C2 and by IH we have ~--D C2. Since D is complete 
134 L. Hallniis 
this means that I-- D C 1 ---> C 2. I f  on the other hand I--- D C I ---> C 2 and Def(D)  ~ C1, 
then by IH and the totality of  D we have Def(D)  ~ C2. Thus Def(D)  ~ CI ~ C2. 
Now Def (Dx)  = X, so assume X ~ A for A e D(a),  then a e OD(X), i.e. a e X. I f  
a e X, then a e ~D(X) ,  SO there is some Ae D(a) such that X ~ A. 
(iii) Since D is both total and complete we know that ~D C is equivalent o 
Def(D)  ~ C. Assume a eDef (D) ,  then Def (D)~ A for some Ae D(a) so a e 
OD(Def(D)).  I f  a e dPo(Def(D)) , then there is some A~ D(a) such that F-DA SO 
a e Def(D).  Now let X be another fixpoint of  OD. It follows from (ii) that 
Coy (D) c Coy (Dx) .Assumex e X andxe  Def (D) .Thenx  F-o _l_,so x ~--Dx A_which 
is absurd, hence xe  Def(D).  [] 
5.2. Intensional operators 
By an intensional operator we will understand an operator that takes definitions 
as arguments and gives definitions as values. In other words, an operator that is 
defined for intensional objects like definitions rather than the extensional properties 
they define. A definition D may directly be considered as such an operator, 
D(D' )={a = A l (a  = A) e D and Ae Cov(D')}, 
or more generally 
D(F, D') = {a = A l(a = A) e V and F t--D, A}. 
We can ask for extensional fixpoints in the sense of  Def(D(D' ) )= Def(D')  or 
intensional ones in terms of D(D') = D'. 
A basic example of  an intensional operator is given by the definition of  F-D which 
clearly is a function of  D. One may view ~o as decomposable into the following 
operators (rules): 
(T) 
(±) 
(--) 
(As) 
(ha) 
(a~) 
T (D)  = {F t- T = T} 
$ (D)  = {F, $ I-- C = T} 
t t (D)  = {F, a t- a = T} 
A&(D) = {F t- (C,)~,, = (P t- C~),~,} 
4A(D)={(F , (C , ) ,~ ,~C'=F,C ,~-C ' )  ( /e l )}  
Aa(D)={F b- C---> C '=F,  C F- C'} 
aA(D)={F,  C,-->Ca t- C=(F}--  C, ,F ,  C2t-- C)} 
A6(D)={(FF -a=Ft -A)  (AeD(a) )}  
6A(D) = {F, a t-- C = (F, A t- C)A~r,(~)} 
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where a ranges over U, C over Cond(U) and F over finite sets of conditions over 
U. 
Let g(D)= T(D)+ ±(D)+~L(D)+ Aqb(D)+cbA(D)+ Aa(D)+aA(D)+ Ag(D)+ 
~SA(D). We can then think of F--D in the following way: 
/" ~D C iff F ~ C c Def(a(D)). 
In this manner we may consider other interpretations of the local notion of 
consequence generated by a definition. For the case of function definitions--as 
discussed in Section 4 we need a linear variant as basis. We will not give any 
interpretation of T and _t_ (in this particular case we are not interested in truth and 
falsity). 
(~) ~(D)={a ~- a =T} 
(~X)  ~A (D)={(F,(C,),c,~-C'=F,C,~-C') ( i~I) ((C~),~I£F)} 
(~;t ) ,~X- (D)={(r ,c , ->c2~c=(r~c , , r ,  c2~c) )  (c,-*c~/')} 
(BA-) ~A-(D)={(F,a~-C=(F,A~-C)A~D(,~) (aGE)} 
Let •-(D)=L(D)+ Afb(D)+fbA(D) + Xa(D)+ah (D)+ A~(D)+~A-(D). I fD  
is a function definition we are basically only interested in a ~- bc  
Def(~-(V) -  h~(V)), so let 4~(V) = g - (D) -AS(D) .  
Let A ~-+ B be defined to hold iff A ~- Be Def(,~(+)). Then it is easy to see that 
m+n ~-+ k iff m+n = k. By induction on n, 
n=O: 
mF-m 
m+O~ m 
is the only possible proof in this case, thus the claim holds. 
n=n '+ l :  
A proof in this case must have the following form: 
m+n'~-v s(v)~-k 
(m+ n'--> v)--> s(v) F- k 
s(m+n')~-k 
m+s(n')F- k
We have s(v)=k and by IH m+n'=v, so m+s(n')=k. [] 
Of course there is a lot to consider here when it comes to viewing intensional 
operators as expressing various forms of evaluation. 
If we were to explicate structural aspects of definitions in terms of categories of 
definitions over U, then intensional operators would naturally be considered as 
functors satisfying certain additional uniformity conditions. 
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6. Natural deduction and total objects 
In this section we will discuss various matters that are connected with a natural 
deduction interpretation of the local "logic" generated by a definition. 
6.1. A natural deduction calculus 
6.1.1. Rules of inference 
Let D be a definition. The basic natural deduction calculus N(D) associated 
with D is given by the following rules of inference: 
(A) C 
(T1) ¥ 
± 
(±E) - -  
C 
Ci (i~ I) 
(()I) 
(C,),~, 
(C,),~ (()E) 
c, 
( i~I) 
C~[ C~ ] 
(~I) 
Cl ~ C2 
(-, E) Ci Cl ~ C2 
c~ 
(DI) ,4 (AcD(a)) 
a 
(DE) 
a C[A] (A~ D(a)) 
C 
The notation [C] indicates that the assumption [C] is discharged at the inference 
step in question. A deduction is as usual built up using these rules of inference. 
C1-  C2 is the major premise in -E- inferences and a is the major premise in 
DE-inferences. 
Let H(C) denote a deduction with C as conclusion and H(B[A]) a deduction 
of B from A- -and  possibly other assumptions. If H is a deduction of A from B 
and H '  a deduction of B let H(H'/B) denote the deduction that results from 
substituting H '  for the assumption B in H. 
A cut in a deduction is an occurrence of a condition which is the conclusion of 
an application of an /-inference and at the same time the major premise of an 
E-inference. If  H is a deduction that ends with an E-inference, then we may follow 
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major premises upwards in H until we reach a cut--the main cut--or an assumption. 
The branch we followed in H is called the main branch in H. 
6.1.2. Rules of contraction 
We have the following rules of contraction for eliminating cuts: 
H'(C2[C,]) 
H(C,) C,-~C2 
C2 
H' (H/C, )  
H~(C~) ( i c I )  
(C),~, 
(:7, oH,  
H(B) 
a HA(C[A]) (Ac D(a)) 
C 
HR(H/B) 
A deduction H is said to be normal if it does not contain any cut. If H has a 
main cut, let Con(H) denote the result of applying the corresponding rule of 
contraction to this cut. 
Proposition 6.1.1. F ~-t~ C iff there is a normal deduction of C from F in N ( D ). 
Proof. If F ~-D C, then we have a proof in a certain cut-free sequent calculus. The 
standard translation of proofs in such a calculus into deductions in natural deduction 
gives us a normal deduction of C from F. We argue by a simple induction on the 
given proof. Let us just consider a case in the induction step to illustrate how this 
translation is carried out. Assume our proof ends with an application of the D ~--rule. 
By IH we have normal deductions HA(C[A]) for all Ac D(a). So 
a HA(C[A]) (a6D(a) )  
C 
gives us a normal deduction of C from F, a. 
So assume we have a normal deduction H of C from F in N(D).  It follows then 
easily by induction on H that F ~-i) C. 
If H is just an assumption, we are immediately done, and if H ends with an 
/-inference, then it follows directly from IH that F ~-D C. 
If H ends with an E-inference, then it has a cut free main branch since it is a 
normal deduction. The main branch will end in an application of an E-inference. 
The (±E) case is trivial. If the main branch ends with an -~E-inference we have 
by IH F, C2 ~-l~ C and F ~-,) C,. Thus by (~- ) ,  /7, C, -~ C2 ~- C. The case of ( ) E 
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follows by a similar argument. If  the main branch ends with an DE-inference we 
have a deduction H(H, /B)  where H, is of the following form: 
a HA(B[A]) 
B 
Now we may apply IH to H(HA/B) ,  so we have F, A ~-o C for all A ~ D(a). Thus 
by(D~-) ,F ,a~-oC.  [] 
So the property of being a total definition corresponds to the normal form property 
of N(D) :  if F ~-oA and I;, A F-o C, then we have normal deductions of A from F 
and of C from 2;, A. Put these deductions together and we have a deduction of C 
from F, 2;. The normal form property ensures that there is a normal deduction of 
C from F, I;. Thus F, I; ~o  C. One may conversely interpret the normal form theorem 
as stating that the definition shown by the introduction rules of a natural deduction 
calculus is total. 
The definition R in Section 2 is the canonical example of a nontotal definition 
and thus also a typical example of a definition generating a natural deduction system 
that doesn't have the normal form property. 
6.1.3. Normalizability 
I f  we are interested in further structural aspects of definitions that can be explicated 
in terms of natural deduction we may consider a notion of normalizability. 
• I f  H is an assumption, then H is normalizable. 
• If  H ends with an/- inference,  then H is normalizable if the premise deductions 
of this inference are all normalizable. 
• If  H ends with an E-inference, then H is normalizable if H has no main cut 
and all minor deductions along the main branch are normalizable or H has a 
main cut and Con(H) is normalizable. 
(This definition of normalizability follows Martin-L6f [12]). 
A simple example of a definition that is total, and thus has the normal form 
property, but generates a deduction that is not normalizable is given by 
S{a -= a ~ a}. 
We can copy the deduction showing that R is not total using S and this deduction 
is not normalizable for the same reasons. This is a structural property of S as a 
definition and cannot be read off from the logic generated by $. 
6.2. Definitions as type systems 
N(D)  is a system of natural deduction in the ususal sense, so we may consider 
some notion of realizability similar to the one stuied by Mart in-Lff  and others in 
the tradition of Curry and Howard. So we think of conditions as types and the 
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objects realizing these types will be descriptions of the structure of deductions giving 
the conditions as conclusions. Given a definition D let p, q , . . .  denote clauses in D. 
(A) x:C 
(T) T :T 
a:_L (±) 
±(a):C 
ci:Ci ( i c I )  
(v) 
(c,),~,:(C,),~, 
c:(C),~, 
(P) 
c.i : Ci 
b(x): C2[x : C,] (*) 
Axb(x) :C1 ~ C2 
b : C1 a : Cl --> C2 (ap) 
(ab): C2 
c :A  
(DI) (p -~ (a = A)) 
p(c):a 
c: a bA(X ) : C[x: A] (A e D(a)) 
(DE) 
E(c, ((X)ba)aeD(a)): C 
An object is called canonical if it is of the form T, p(a), (q);~; or Axb(x). The 
computation rules for noncanonical objects are as ususal based on the rules of 
contraction for the corresponding deductions in N(D):  
(Axb(x)a) :::> b(a/x) ,  (ci),~,.j ::=> cj, 
E(p(c ) ,  ((x)ba)aeD(a)) :::> bB(C/X) (p=-- (a = B). 
As usual these computation rules preserve types. So what we have corresponds 
to partial correctness: if c realizes C and can be computed into a canonical object 
c', then c' realizes C also. This means we may consider strong type systems for 
partial functions. To understand the type information means understanding the 
status the given definition gives to the condition in question. 
An investigation of definitions as type systems based on the finite presentation 
of definitions given in [8] is carried out by Fredholm and Serafimovski (see [7]). 
6.3. Notations of computability and validity 
Tait introduced an elegant and powerful method for proving normalization in 
systems of typed A-calculus by giving an intensional notion of computability for 
terms [25]. This method was adopted for proving normalization i systems of natural 
deduction by Martin-LSf in [12]. Usually this notion of computability is defined by 
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recursion on some well-founded relation. All the basic strength that is needed to 
carry out the normalization proof is hidden in this definition. The normalization 
proof is then really a soundness argument relative to a semantics provided by the 
notion of computability. Now we could view this notion of computability as given 
by elementary means in terms of a partial inductive definition. As an example we 
will consider such a definition of a notion of computability for deductions in N(D). 
Following Prawitz (see [18]) we talk about validity of deductions. 
6.3.1. Validity 
The following definition will define a notion of validity for deductions in N(D):  
1 
T=T 
H,(C,) (ieI) 
(C,),~, = (H,),~I 
V H(A)=HH(C-~ C12] )a  (AeD(a))(Hc'(C1)">H(Hc'/CI))Hc'cN(D) I 
H = Con(H) (H is in E-form and has a main cut) 
Proposition 6.3.1. lf H • Def ( V) and H ends with an E-inference, then H will reduce 
to some H' • Def ( V) which will end with an I-inference. 
Proof. If H e Def(V), then this will hold only because Con(H)• Def(V), so in a 
finite number of reduction steps we must reach some H'  • Def(V) which ends with 
an /-inference. [] 
Prawitz has used such a general notion of validity as a central concept in 
discussions on the foundation of a general proof theory ([19, 20]). His notion is 
based on recursively defined concepts and so is not directly an example of a partial 
inductive definition. We could compare this notion of validity to the notion of truth 
for a proposition as given for propositional logic in Section 4. So we may consider 
a notion of a deduction as being valid in an interpretation. An interpretation K 
should then be a definition over the following set Q of deductions: 
(i) All assumptions are in Q. 
(ii) If H ends with an E-inference and has a cut-free main branch with normaliz- 
able minor deductions along the main branch, then H is in Q. 
Let us write E(H) as short for condition (ii) on H and let EC(H) be short for 
the following condition on H: H ends with an E-inference and has a main cut. 
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Let K ~ H be short for ~-v+~: H. We have the following general properties: 
K~T 
K~C iff ~-KC 
K~H iff ~-K H (E(H)) 
K~H iff K ~ Con(H) (EC(H)) 
H,(C,) ( i c I )  
K~ iff K~ Hi ( i c I )  (C)~, 
H(C'[C]) 
K~ C~C'  iff (Hc(C)~-v+KH(Hc/C))Hc~N(D) 
H(A) 
K ~ - -  iff K~H 
a 
Let M = {H = T}H~O, then M ~ H is Martin-LSfs notion of a computable deduc- 
tion [12] seen as a partial inductive definition. If  M ~ H, then H is normalizable. 
This can be seen by analyzing the structure of M ~ H. When the notion of validity 
is used as a tool for proving normalization (see [12, 18]) we prove by elementary 
means, i.e. induction on the length of a deduction H, that M ~ H. While this proof 
is elementary it is entirely dependent on strong closure properties of the notion of 
a valid deduction. These properties can of course not be directly read off from the 
elementary definition of K ~ H. If  V+ K is a total and complete definition, then 
K ~ H will have the closure properties we need for the proof. 
Proposition 6.3.2. If V+ K is a total and complete definition, then K ~ H~(A~)i~I 
implies K ~ H(Hi/Ai, ( ic I)) where all open assumptions in H are among {Ai}i~1. 
Proof. This is the standard proof that M ~ H for all H. It goes through by an 
elementary induction on the length of H. We use the fact that if V+ M is total and 
complete, then H ~-V+K H '  simply means if K ~ H, then K ~ H'. [] 
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